1 may be difficult and costly to implement and the policy maker is very unlikely to ever be in possession of perfect information. 4 Despite the widespread and increasing use of financial assistance to firms encouraging job generation (see Holden and Swales, 1995 and Wren, 2003) , rigorous econometric analysis of the actual job additionality of such subsidies is rather limited. Nevertheless, overall the view appears to be that deadweight spending, i.e., spending on non-additional jobs, represents a large part of financial assistance. Using qualitative survey data for selected groups of Irish firms, Lehinan (1999) and Lehinan et al (2003) find deadweight spending to be between 40 and 80 per cent. 5 Also, Cotta and Mahy (1998) using the results from a firm level questionnaire find that the equivalent figure varies between 46 and 62 per cent for a similar scheme in Belgium. Wren (1994) , on the other hand, provides econometric evidence that in certain limited cases grants under the Regional Financial Assistance programme did positively affect the build-up and duration of employment in the UK.
One crucial issue in assessing the amount of additionality due to financial assistance is determining what the employment level of the grant recipient would have been without government support. Clearly, however, this is unobservable, since one only observes a funded firm's actual employment and not the number of workers it would have employed without the subsidy. To deal with this missing 'counterfactual' most studies rely on subjective assessments by either the firm itself or the policymaker; see van der Linden (1995) , Cotta and Mahy (1998) , Disney et al. (1992) and Foley (1992) , Lehinan (1999) and Lehinan et al (2003) .
In contrast, the few econometric studies, such as Wren (1989) and Wren (1994) , use as control group those firms that did not receive any assistance.
4 Picard (2001) shows under asymmetric information that the first best situation can be achieved when the gap between firms optimal level of employment and the optimal level desired by the grant authority is not too large and firms are different enough in terms of their unobserved productivity. Wren (2003) argues that discretionary assistance is more efficient than non-discretionary assistance. The level of assistance is conditional on the investment scale rather than employment targets which he argues have larger information costs. 5 The actual result varies according to what groups of firms was examined and distinguishing between partial and full deadweight spending.
These approaches are, however, potentially problematic in terms of concluding on the job additionality aspect of financial assistance. For example, the use of non-recipients as a comparison group would only be justified if the provision of grants were a completely random process, otherwise the analysis would suffer from selection bias. In reality, of course, this is unlikely to be the case as authorities will select recipients among the pool of candidates according to some selection criteria in the case of discretionary assistance, 6 or firms may select themselves non-randomly where grants are extended on a non-discretionary basis. In terms of using qualitative survey data, in contrast, the assessment of the 'counterfactual' may be rather subjective. Moreover, there may be incentives for being untruthful. For example, arguably a firm may have an incentive to be 'untruthful' about what employment would have otherwise been, as in the case where the firm fears that its answer may affect its future ability to succeed in obtaining assistance. 7 Similarly policymakers may have little incentive to reveal the true deadweight losses involved in grant provision in order not be seen as having 'wasted' public funds.
The current paper re-examines empirically the issue of the effectiveness of subsidisation in creating job additionality. In doing so we extend the literature in a number of important ways. Firstly, we address the issue of the endogeneity of grant receipt in examining its effect on employment. Secondly, we have access to Irish manufacturing plant level data, which allows us to explicitly estimate a plant's labour demand function. We also have exhaustive information on the complete grant history of the sample of plants included, rather than just information on a specific programme. Studying Ireland is arguably particularly suitable to the task at hand as Irish industrial policy has had a long history of using discretionary grants to encourage job creation and growth. 8 As noted earlier, previous more rudimentary estimates for Ireland seem to indicate little evidence of job additionality.
Furthermore, given Ireland's peculiar industrial structure, which relies heavily on foreign multinational firms (e.g., Barry and Bradley, 1997; Görg and Strobl, 2002) , we are able to analyse the different effects of grants on domestic and foreign plants separately. As we show below, this unearths some important differences across these two groups.
The paper is organised as follows. In the following section we describe briefly the financial grant system in Ireland. Our data set and summary statistics are provided in Section III. The econometric analysis is contained in Section IV. Using our econometric estimates of job additionality we undertake some simple cost-benefit calculation in Section V. The final section concludes.
Section II: Grant Provision in Ireland 9
Grants for industrial development were first offered in Ireland under the Underdeveloped Areas Act of 1952. This was enacted to assist the provision of an alternative source of employment to replace declining agricultural employment in rural sectors, specfically by providing cash grants of up to 50 per cent of the cost of machinery and equipment and up to 100 per cent of the cost of land and buildings and for the training of workers in certain underdeveloped areas. 10 In the late 1950s, however, there was an erosion of the regional emphasis in favour of a more nationally oriented approach based on exportled growth. Subsequently the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1965, which paved way for Ireland's eventual membership of the EEC in 1973. This, in conjunction with the already existent export tax relief, made Ireland an attractive location for multinationals.
At the same time the industrial grant system was expanded, increasingly trying to develop the virtually non-existent technology intensive sectors.
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The range of grants that have been available to firms included capital grants, training grants, rent subsidies, employment maintenance grants, feasibility study grants, technology acquisition grants, loan guarantees and interest subsidies, and research and development grants. The essence of this industrial strategy has remained an integral part of Irish industrial policy until today.
The agency primarily responsible for the provision of grant assistance in manufacturing in the modern era was the Industrial Development Agency (IDA) until 1994 12 , after which it was split into IDA Ireland and Forbairt. The former is now responsible for the grant provision to foreign owned firms while the latter presides over assisting indigenous plants. 13 While there have been some changes in the provision of grants over time, provision within the time period examined in our empirical analysis can be safely summarised as follows (see KPMG, 2003) . Projects suitable for assistance had to either involve the production of goods primarily for export, be of an advanced technological nature for supply to international trading or skilled self supply firms within Ireland, and/or be in sectors of the Irish market that are subject to international competition. In order to be eligible the applicant has to generally show that the project required financial assistance, is viable, and has an adequate equity capital base. More importantly with regard to the current paper, projects had to be able to generate new employment or maintain existing employment in Ireland. The actual grant level is generally very project specific and subjected to a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis.
Additionally, total grant levels can generally not exceed certain capital cost thresholds, usually 10 See Meyler and Strobl (2000) for details. 11 While regional concerns still dominated in the 1970s, by the early 1980s a strategic industry approach, encouraging the attraction of multinationals and the development of an indigenous sector in technology intensive sectors became the primary concern. Nevertheless regions always remained of at least some concern. 12 IDA Ireland is also the principal organisation for promoting industrial development in Ireland. In the very early years, grant provision was under the authority of the Underdeveloped Areas Board before this responsibility was taken over by the IDA. 13 After 1998 Forbairt become Enterprise Ireland as a consequence of a merger with the Irish Trade board.
between 45 and 60 per cent. Payment was usually made in pre-specified instalments such that further payment was often subject to periodic reviews.
14 Finally, one should emphasise that an important aspect of financial assistance in
Ireland has been and continues to be employment generation. In the earlier days of financial assistance, i.e., until about the mid-1980s, this resulted in some cases in setting explicit job creation targets for certain regions and sectors, and putting pressure on policymakers to fill these. Additionally, until today large proposed job gains due to projects are generally widely publicised in the Irish media. Moreover, at the project level in practise grant levels were often determined at least in part with a view to how many jobs the proposed project would create.
As a matter of fact, in many cases specific job creation targets were attached to a specific project, agreed upon by both the grant provider and the applicant. However, even when employment creation targets were not explicitly stated as a condition for grant receipt, they are likely to have been a consideration in the formulation of the grants package. For example, Honohan (1998) notes that "…even when the statutory ceiling on grants is expressed in terms of a fraction of fixed capital investment, it is clear that this ceiling tends to be reached only for job rich projects". Given that grant packages were negotiated on a case by case basis one would thus expect potential employers to commit at least informally to additional job creation in such negotiations. Thus, arguably, in general subsidies in Ireland acted in part as marginal employment subsidies.
Section III: Data
In order to analyse the employment effects of government grants we utilise information from three data sources collected by Forfás, the Irish policy and advisory board with responsibility for enterprise, trade, science, and technology. statistics on financial assistance development we can, however, resort to using the grant and employment data for the entire sample period and for the entire population.
In order to gain some insight into how representative our final sample is of the Irish manufacturing plant population we provide some summary statistics in Table 1 . As can be seen, our sample consists of 16.2 per cent of all plants and 11.6 of total observations in Irish manufacturing. Unsurprisingly our sample of large plants consists of substantially more foreign plants (which tend to be larger than domestic ones) and is characterised by an average size slightly over four times than the average employment in the population. Moreover, the incident of grant payment as well as the size of each payment is noticeably larger. Since our sample is only a survey of large plants it is fruitful to compare it to the total population of large plants. To do this we simply dropped all plants whose size never reached 20 employees from our total sample. As can be seen, our sample constitutes 74 per cent of these. One may want to note that the loss of 26 per cent is mainly due to plants not having been included in our sample at all, rather than non-response by covered plants. 21 In terms of the other features given in Table 1 , our sample has only slightly more foreign plants, a somewhat greater average size, marginally higher grant payment incidence, and a somewhat smaller average grant amount. Thus, in general, one may conclude that our sample is representative of the population of large plants.
[ Table 1 here]
As a means of gauging general trends and a potential link between growth performance and grant provision in Irish manufacturing we graph total manufacturing employment and total grant payments, appropriately rescaled, in Figure 1 . Accordingly, total grant provision rose from the beginning of from which data for these two variables are available (1972), peaked in the early 1980s, upon which total (real) amount of grant payments declined until 1990, rose for the early 1990s somewhat, but has been on a general decline since then. At the same time employment in Irish manufacturing similarly rose in the 1970s, fell substantially during the recessionary period of the 1980s, but has recovered substantially since the late 1980s.
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[ Figure 1 here]
21 Non-response only constitutes 2 percentage points of the 26 per cent difference. 22 One may note that there appears to a change in the pattern of correlation between employment grant payments in the graph. However, further investigation at the two digit sector level suggests that this is simply a visual consequence of aggregation bias, since there are no similar patterns at this more disaggregated level.
In Figure 2 we plot the number of plants in Irish manufacturing and their proportion receiving grants. Accordingly, while the number of plants in Irish manufacturing has increased, in any year about 10 -20 per cent of plants are supported by a grant payment.
Figure 3 reveals that on average the amount received per recipient was much higher in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, but has fallen since. However, one should note that at the same time the average size of plants has fallen, so that the amount paid per recipient has remained relatively constant; see Cassidy and Strobl (2004) .
[Figures 2 and 3 here]
We also used the information on the job approval amount associated with projects for the small sub-sample of projects for which this was available and graph the average over the years in Figure 4 . As can be seen, the average amount of money per agreed additional employment has from the 1970s until early 1990s generally been on a decline, but appears to have stabilised. More precisely, until the 1980s, normally more than 20,000 Euros (1995 prices) were spent on each additional job. By the 1990s, the fall in this per job expenditure has stabilised on average to about 15,000 Euros per job. One may want to note that the two spikes in the data are driven by particularly large payments (relative to jobs agreed to be created) to a few multinationals in these years.
[ Figure 4 here]
Section IV: Econometric Analysis
In order to investigate whether financial assistance has resulted in additional employment in Irish manufacturing plants we specify, in the spirit of Nickell (1987) , the following dynamic labour demand function for plant i in year t,
where l, w, and y are logged values of employment, wages per head, and output, respectively. g is the log of the total amount of grant received by the plant covering payments under all types of available schemes. 23 Moreover, τ t , η i and ε it are time specific effects, plant specific time invariant effects, and an i.i.d. error term, respectively all unobservable (to the econometrician). We have also included a lagged value of the dependent variable in (1). This is standard as arguably labour demand may be dynamic in nature because of a non-smooth adjustment process in plants' employment policy (see, for example, Hamermesh, 1993) .
One should note that simply using OLS to estimate (1) is likely to prove problematic.
Specifically, employment is likely to be simultaneously determined with output and may also affect plant level wages if the plant is not a price taker in the local labour market. More importantly, as argued earlier, financial assistance is likely to be endogenous to the employment decision. First, certain firms may be more likely to apply for grants or ask for a greater grant amount. For example, if governments are more likely to 'pick winners', i.e., firms that are already doing well, then these may also be more likely to apply. 24 On the other hand, firms in financial trouble may find greater benefits from applying for grants relative to its costs. Secondly, without perfect information on potential job additionality policymakers may use other criteria to select recipients. In other words, there may be other plant specific characteristics important in the grant selection and amount determination process that are unobservable to the econometrician (i.e., given the information in our data set on each plant) but correlated with grant receipt. If such sample selection biases were time invariant then simply first differencing the data would provide a possible solution. 25 However, given the length of the panel of individual plants (up to 15 years) this is unlikely to be the case.
In order to take account of such potential endogeneity while also controlling for plant specific fixed effects, we thus resort to using the now popular GMM systems estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) . Accordingly, one simultaneously estimates first differenced and level versions of equation (1), where for the former appropriately lagged 23 In order to avoid dropping zero values we arbitrarily added 0.0001 to these. 24 Given a limited budget, accountability may create incentives for policy makers to pick 'winners'.
values and for the latter appropriately lagged differences of the endogenous variables can serve as valid instruments. The validity of these instruments can be tested using Arellano and Bond's (1991) Sargan test. Also, in our dynamic specification the consistency of the GMM systems estimator depends on the validity of the assumption of no serial correlation of the error terms. We investigate this using the test by Arellano and Bond (1991) , which was specifically developed for dynamic panel models under GMM and tests the presence of second-order serial correlation in the first differenced error term.
As noted earlier, using all information necessary to estimate the plant level labour demand equation required linking all three of the data sources and hence resulted in only a sample of the total plant population. Specifically, the use of information on wages and output from the IEE left us with a sub-sample of larger (at least 20 employees at the first time of inclusion) plants covering the period 1983-1998. 26 In total we were left with 12,410 plantyear observations, of which 41 per cent were observations where grant payments were made to the plant. This covers in total 2,110 plants, of which 1,464 received at least one grant over their lifetime observed over our sample period. Moreover, 726 of these plants are foreign and 1,384 domestic owned. We provide sample statistics of this subsample by whether grant payment was received or not in Table 2 . One should note in this regard that most plants received at least one grant payment, if not several, over their lifetime, although not necessarily within the window of our sample period. As can be seen from our summary statistics in Of course, whether these jobs were additional, i.e., would have been created without assistance, is a priori not clear and a matter to be disentangled by our econometric analysis.
[ Table 2 here]
Before proceeding to our GMM system results it is important to discuss certain aspects with respect to the number of instruments used to generate these. First of all, the number of available instruments will depend on the length of observations available for each plant and on the exogeneity of the explanatory variables. For instance, if one has included a one period lagged dependent variable and contemporaneous, but endogenous, other controls as explanatory variables, then lags from t-2 to the maximum available of all of these may serve as valid instruments as long as there is no second order serial correlation. In our case, where we can have up to 15 observations for plants this would leave us with a large number of instruments at hand. 27 However, as noted by Roodman (2007) , while increasing the number of instruments used may increase efficiency, using many instruments can distance the estimates from the asymptotic ideal, and overfit endogenous variables. Moreover, it may weaken the Sargan test up to the point where it generates implausibly high p-values. 27 Under the GMM systems estimator the valid instrument count increases quadratically in the number of periods.
Unfortunately, there appears to be no clear guidance available as to what constitutes a 'good' number of instruments; see Roodman (2007) . We thus first experimented with using a variety of number of lags as instruments. While the results were generally qualitatively similar in terms of the significance of the explanatory variables and the Sargan test generally supported the validity of the instruments, clearly the p-value of the Sargan test rose noticeably as instruments were added.
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As a compromise we thus chose to use the minimum number of instruments above which the coefficient estimate was generally stable across all our specifications, which turned out to be up to four lags.
29, 30
Our GMM estimates of (1) for all plants are provided in Table 3 . One may want note that, in addition to support for instruments as indicated by the Sargan statistic, in all our specifications there is no evidence of second order autocorrelation, which would render our results inconsistent. In the first column we estimated plant level labour demand in our sample, controlling for lagged employment, wages, and output and for their endogeneity by the method briefly outlined above. One can see that the coefficients of our standard labour demand explanatory variables are as would be expected -higher wages decrease, while greater output increases the demand for labour. Additionally, the estimates of the labour elasticities with respect to wages and output are in line with the literature using firm level data; see Hamermesh (1993) . Moreover, the significance of the lagged dependent variable validates the use of a dynamic labour demand equation.
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[ Table 3 here]
In the second column we include the logged grants variable without taking account of its potential endogeneity. Although the coefficient on this variable is positive, it is statistically insignificant. This would suggest that financial assistance within our sample has not been 28 Roodman (2007) notes that unusually high p-values may be interpreted as a sign of too many instruments. 29 While using less instruments almost always produced qualitatively similar results, often the size of the coefficient changed substantially. 30 For example, when we included t to t-5 of the grant variable we used as instruments for these lags t-7, t-8, t-9, and t-10.
successful in creating additional employment on average. As argued in the introduction, however, grants are unlikely to be an exogenous variable, and we thus need to instrument this variable as well. The result of doing so is shown in the third column. There are two notable changes compared to the previous estimation. Firstly, the coefficient on the grants variable has increased substantially in size. More importantly, it is now statistically significant, suggesting that financial assistance has increased employment in plants in Irish manufacturing. In other words, this estimation provides some evidence of job additionality of financial assistance once the endogeneity of the grants variable is properly taken into account. One should note that the change in statistical significance after controlling for endogeneity possibly suggests that larger firms receive larger grants.
Feasibly the effect of grant payments may not be instantaneous, i.e., plants may make their employment adjustment over several years. Moreover, some of the jobs created may be subsequently destroyed once the funds are spent or if found impractical to maintain. To investigate this further we included up to 5 lags of logged grant payments in our specification in (1), the results of which are shown in the last column of Table 3 . 32 As can be seen, the inclusion of the lags more than doubles the coefficient on the current logged grant payments, indicating that the labour adjustment to grant payments may be more complex than a simple instantaneous hiring. One may want to note that this increase is only partially due to the smaller sub-sample -when we estimated the same sample without lags the coefficient turned out to be 0.0035. Of the lagged values, however, only the t-2 lag is statistically significant, with its coefficient being somewhat smaller than the current value. Thus plants on average make the largest adjustment in the same year as the payment, and then further increase employment around another two years later. 31 We also experimented with higher lags of the dependent variable, adjusting the instruments implemented accordingly, but these always proved to be insignificant. 32 One should note that this necessarily meant reducing our sample size by 60 per cent.
An important feature of the Irish manufacturing sector is the presence of foreign multinationals; roughly about 50 percent of employment in manufacturing is in affiliates of foreign-owned multinationals (Görg and Strobl, 2002) . Arguably, we may expect differencces in the employment response to grants between foreign and domestic plants and, hence, pooling these two groups together may not be appropriate. In particular, foreign multinationals may be expected to be less financially constrained than domestic firms because they tend to be part of a large multi-plant operation. Hence, their choice of employment levels may less likely be depending on government subsidies in their employment creation compared to domestic plants.
To investigate this further, we split our sample into domestic and foreign owned plants and show summary statistics for these in Table 4 . Overall, we find that, not surprisingly, foreign plants tend to be larger than domestic plants whether they are in receipt of a grant or not. Additionally, they tend to pay higher wages. In terms of grant vs. nongrant recipients, we find for foreign plants that grant recipients tend to be larger in terms of employment and output, but show lower average wages than non-grant recipients. For domestic plants, however, we find that recipients and non-recipients are much more similar in terms of these characteristics, while grant recipients employ slightly more workers on average, they appear to produce less output and pay lower wages. Using these summary statistics to calculate labour productivity (Y/L) we find that grant recipients for both nationality groups are on average less productive than non-grant recipients.
There are also some stark differences in terms of comparing grant payments and performance. Foreign plants receive on average grant payments that are five times higher than those received by domestic plants. In using the limited job target data available, evidence indicates, however, that the associated number of jobs that are expected to be created is also substantially higher, making the difference in agreed payment per job between the two ownership types not as stark. Comparing the actual level of employment created during payment years relative to the job target, one discovers that in raw numbers foreign plants tend to create more, and domestic plants less jobs than the agreed number.
[ Table 4 here]
Estimating equation (1) for the samples of domestic and foreign plants separately yields results are reported in Table 5 . One should note that in these regressions we continue to treat the grant variable as endogenous to the employment decision, in line with the previous estimations in Table 3 . Comparing the results for the other explanatory variables first in our base specification of including current logged grant payments, as shown in columns 1 and 4, one notices some difference across nationality of ownership. In particular, labour demand in foreign firms is more sensitive to changes in the price of labour and output.
One reason for this may be that because foreign firms are by definition part of a multinational operation, it is easier for them to adjust their production process to changes in price and product demand (Görg and Strobl, 2003a) . In contrast, there is only a marginal difference in the coefficients on grant payments across nationality of ownership.
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We also added up to t-5 lags of the logged grant payments in order to investigate whether the adjustment process is sluggish, as shown for domestic and foreign plants in the second and fifth column of Table 5 . As can be seen, this produces some interesting dynamics. For foreign plants we find that grant payments cause a decaying positive effect on job creation, lasting up to one year after payment. In contrast, while the subsidies have a significant positive effect on job creation up to three years after receipt for domestic plants,
by the fourth year some of these jobs are destroyed, as shown by the negative significant coefficient on the t-4 lag of the logged grant payments variable. Taking the significant coefficients across plants at face value and using mean employment levels for both types of 33 One should note that coefficient for the pooled sample ( to subsequent years since it is likely to take time to reach the desired level of employment with imperfect labour and capital markets. To investigate this we created a zero-one type dummy that takes a value of one in the first four years of start-up and zero otherwise, START, and included this variable and its interaction with contemporaneous grant payments in (1). 35 The results of this are given for domestic and foreign plants in columns 3 and 6 of Table 5 , respectively. As can be seen from the interaction term, for domestic plants there is no different job creation effect of grants in the first few years after start-up relative to
should not necessarily expect the coefficient for the pooled sample to lie between the coefficients for domestic and foreign firms, since it is biased and can lie on either sides of the "boundaries". 34 The averages taken used for this are for the total domestic and foreign sample rather than just for grant recipients, as calculated in Table 4 , since the estimated coefficient is based on both recipients and non-recipients. 35 One should note that this did not allow the inclusion of lagged variables given the nature of START. subsequent years of the plant's life cycle. In contrast, the significantly positive coefficient on the interaction term in the foreign plants sample provides evidence that grants have a greater employment creation effect in the first four years after the location of foreign multinational plants in Ireland. This is suggestive of the possibility that our estimates of job creation for multinationals are likely to be lower thresholds of the total job creation induced by subsidies.
[ Table 5 here]
Section V: Cost-Benefit Analysis
It is of course valid to question whether such subsidies as those employed in Ireland can be justified from an economic perspective. In order to do so on a more general scale one would need to conduct a thorough quantitative analysis of all the benefits and costs of the policy. Our analysis above, however, simply provides results concerning any additional employment created and we can thus evaluate the effectiveness of grants only in the sense of acting as marginal employment subsidies. It is important to emphasise therefore that we are using a narrow measure of benefits. Arguably there are many other potential benefits from the grant schemes employed that are not measured because we do not have direct information on them.
Firstly, it must be remembered that these subsidies were officially for providing resources for firms' activities other than creating jobs, such as capital formation, R&D, etc., and that job creation was only an additional stipulant. Morever, there may have been spillovers to other firms through the direct effects of financial support. For example, they may have encouraged plant entry. Importantly for the Irish case, they may have also played a role in attracting foreign multinationals to locate in Ireland rather than other host economies as Greenfield investment and/or expanding plant capacity -both of these aspects may have then generated further positive spillovers to the domestic industry. Moreover, if the effect on start-up is more important for foreign than for domestic plants, than this would imply that any effect of grants on employment is more likely to be on the extensive rather than intensive margin for foreign relative to domestic plants. The results with regard to plant start up presented in the last part of the previous section are arguably supportive of this assertion.
Additionally, grant payments may have further affected employment by discouraging the departure of foreign multinationals or partial movement of their production capacity to elsewhere and by discouraging outward FDI by domestic plants.
Despite these caveats, it is insightful to evaluate the grants system in terms of its effectiveness as a marginal employment subsidy, particularly because this corresponds closely to the approach taken by Irish industrial policymakers in terms of evaluating potential projects. In essence the rule of thumb implemented by Irish authorities was based on a standard criterion which expressed the discounted present value of the project benefits and compared this to its cost; see Honohan (1998) . Specifically, the cost was taken to be the grant outlay and the benefit to be 85 per cent of the wages generated through the new jobs created.
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One should note that while under the actual cost benefit rule applied to potential projects Irish policy makers had to rely on 'expected' additional employment, our econometric analysis gives us specific values for the number of Euros of grant support necessary to create an additional job. In outlining how we use this in our cost-benefit analysis it is helpful to initially consider the static equation originally proposed by Kaldor (1936) which shows the condition where the cost of a subsidy will be non-positive in a static framework:
where s is the cost of the subsidy per job adjusted for the shadow price of raising public funds which is possibly greater than unity, A is total employment, h is the number of additional jobs created due to subsidisation, λ is a parameter indicating the number of existent jobs covered by the subsidy, and b is the level of benefits. As noted in the introduction, Kaldor (1936) originally proposed an average subsidy, which in (2) . 37 The present value of each additional job (PV) is the present value of the average wage stream generated, net of the shadow wage (the level of the shadow wage is discussed below). PV is calculated in thousands of euros using a discount rate of 3% and assuming that the average job has duration of D years (the duration of the job is also discussed below). Multiplying the measure of jobs created per thousand euros of grants by the present value of these jobs gives the benefit/cost ratio of a euro's worth of grants in terms of the wage stream generated:
One should note that the regressions in Table 5 include up to five lags of the grant variable.
We thus as a benchmark modify the terms in equation (3) to account for this, even if some of these are not found to be significant. In particular one may want to note that the coefficients on the fourth and fifth period lags are negative, indicating the possibility that some jobs created by grants may destroyed again within a few years. The average change in employment per thousand euros associated with any of the lagged coefficients is:
where j goes from 0…5 and j β is the coefficient on the interaction of grants and the j th lag. If the average duration of a job in the economy is D we assume that the number of jobs created that will last for D periods are:
That is we subtract out the number of jobs that will be lost after four or five periods from the initial number of jobs created, then we add on the number of jobs (appropriately discounted)
that will be created in the subsequent three years. In addition to this of the jobs initially created will last for four years and is the present value of a job of duration k, we can modify (3) to get:
That is the present value of the wage stream of all of the jobs created by a euro of grants gives the benefit/ cost ratio.
Following the approach by the Irish authorities we assume the cost of the subsidy to simply be its Euro value. In terms of the remaining parameters in (5), this leaves one to set a value for the shadow wage and the present value of additional employment. We follow Honohan (1998) and assume the shadow wage to be the wage times the fraction of workers in new jobs who would otherwise be unemployed, adjusted for savings in welfare payments and tax receipts from these additional jobs, plus any change in wages for workers in the new job who were previously employed. One issue in doing so is how many of the additional jobs Moreover, the dramatic reduction in unemployment rates associated with the boom period from the mid 1990's onwards suggests labour demand played an important role in increasing employment; see Walsh (2004) . Nevertheless, Honohan's (1998) review of the cost benefit model used by Irish industrial development agencies is critical of the low number they used for the shadow wage (15%) and instead suggests a much higher number around 80%. We could of course argue that since our coefficient estimates are for jobs that are additional to the firm, that we could set a much lower shadow wage than Honohan suggests since his estimate presumably incorporates the fact that some of the jobs created would not be additional to the firm. We thus experiment with a number of different values for the shadow wage.
Finally, in order to determine the present value of additional employment one needs to know the average length of a new job. Our data unfortunately only allows one to determine the number of jobs, but not to follow specific jobs over time. However, as pointed out by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) , if one makes the assumption of a stable distribution of job flows, then the average length of a job is just the inverse of the job destruction rate. 38 Given that the average job destruction rate is about 5.5 per cent for both foreign and indigenous firms in our sample, this implies an average duration of jobs of about 18 years. We did some sensitivity analysis looking at an average duration of 10 years, also as noted above our analysis counts for the fact that some of the jobs initially induced by grants 38 Of course we only observe net changes in employment at firms so that a job may be destroyed and replaced by another job. In this sense net changes in employment will understate true job destruction if some grant aided jobs are replaced by other jobs that would have been created without grants.
disappear after four or five years. The present value of a job is thus just the present value of the average wage for its duration years discounted by a discount rate, which we assume to be 3%.
Using our estimated coefficients and the assumptions above, we calculate benefitcost ratios for indigenous and foreign firms for various levels of the shadow wage relative to the average wage, as calculated from our data, in Table 6 . We first start off in the first panel by using all coefficients of the grant variable and its lags and an average job duration of 18 years, even if these were not found to be significant. As can be seen, when the shadow wage is greater than 63% and 81% for domestic and foreign firms, respectively, the benefit cost ratio exceeds unity. We then calculated the same using only significant coefficients, but, since this made little difference for the domestic sample where the value on the fifth lag was fairly small, only report that for foreign plants. Accordingly, this reduces the benefit cost ratio over all values of the shadow wage.
Even when we assume that the average job duration is 10 years, as shown in the lower panel of Table 6 , a sizeable chunk of the costs of grants are recouped from this fairly narrow measure of benefits, as long as the shadow wage is reasonably high. As a matter of fact, for domestic plants the benefit cost ratio will be greater than one if the shadow wage is set at 0.85 of the average wage. Again, using only the significant coefficients created essentially the same effect for domestic but a considerably smaller impact for foreign plants.
[ Table 6 here]
The analysis suggests fairly large streams of additional wage benefits are generated by grants in both types of firms but particularly in domestic firms. Before concluding that subsidies are more effective in domestic firms though we should sound a note of caution given the discussion earlier on the possibility that grants for foreign firms in particular may induce entry or reduce exit, and the partial evidence supporting this in Table 5 .
Section VI: Conclusion
This paper examines the efficacy of government subsidies to create new jobs. While such policies seem to be widespread, a thorough evaluation of the effectiveness is still in its infancy. We contribute to the literature by analysing the impact on labour demand of government grants using plant level data for the manufacturing industry in Ireland and appropriate econometric techniques to take account of the potential endogeneity of the effect of grant receipt on labour demand. Our results provide evidence for job additionality of subsidies, i.e., the subsidies employed in Ireland have been successful in creating employment over and above the level that would have prevailed in the absence of grant payments. We also find that there are differences in the employment response to subsidies between domestic and foreign-owned plants, with the former creating more additional jobs per euro of grant payment. Using a simple cost-benefit rule of thumb shows that in terms of creating jobs a large part of the cost of grants appears to be recouped in additional wage streams under reasonable assumptions about the parameters.
There are, however, a number of reservations to consider in terms of using the results unearthed in this paper as an answer to the question as to whether the grant system in Ireland has been effective. Firstly, it should be kept in mind that grants in Ireland were officially provided to finance other types of firms' activities, such as capital acquisition and R&D amongst others, and their role as marginal subsidy only an additional stipulation for receipt.
As a matter of fact, other empirical evidence seems to suggest that grant support in Ireland has played a positive role in other aspects of firm performance, such as survival, productivity, and the expenditure on R&D and employee training. 39 Moreover, it is important to note that grants may have also played some part in terms of attracting multinationals to and influencing their scale and nature of operation within Ireland. This may have led to further positive spillovers to domestic industry. In this respect, Ruane and Ugur (2005) and Görg and Strobl 39 See Girma et al (2007a Girma et al ( , 2007b and Strobl (2006, 2007) , (2002, 2003b) provide empirical evidence that domestic industry in Ireland has indeed benefited from the presence of foreign-owned multinationals in the Irish economy in terms of increased entry, survival, and productivity. Finally, one should note that our analysis is, due to data limitations, restricted to larger firms. Particularly the indigenous sectors has a large number of very small firms, some of which have received grant support. Job additionality effects for these may be very different than for larger firms, particularly since small firms tend to be more financially constrained; see Cabral and Mata (2004) . As a matter fact, Lehinan (2004) shows from an analysis of a selective questionnaire that support of smaller Irish firms is less likely to cause deadweight loss. All these other factors suggest that overall benefits from grant support are likely to have been substantially greater in Ireland than would be suggested from taking our empirical findings at face value. (4) Variables instrumented: l(t-1), w, y, g, g(t-1), g(t-2), g(t-3), g(t-4), g(t-5). -1) , w, y, g, g(t-1), g(t-2), g(t-3), g(t-4), g(t-5), START, START*g. 
